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The Cloud author has long been r e c o g n i z e d as one o f the f i n e s t prose 
w r i t e r s i n the E n g l i s h language. Yet because o f h i s s u b j e c t matter — 
s p i r i t u a l guidance — and the seeming d i f f i c u l t y o f h i s theology and meta-
p h y s i c s , he i s not widely known o r read. T h i s paper w i l l attempt to make 
the Cloud author more comprehensible and a c c e s s i b l e by d e s c r i b i n g h i s meta-
p h y s i c s , a task which has h e r e t o f o r e been n e g l e c t e d . 
The b e s t known work o f the Cloud author, from which h i s "name" i s drawn, 
i s The Cloud of Unknowing.^ In i t the anonymous f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E n g l i s h 
mystic i n s t r u c t s an e q u a l l y anonymous " g o o s t l y freende i n God" (Ct/ 13/8; 7/21) 
i n the " s l e i g h t e s " o r techniques o f the contemplative l i f e ; shows c l e a r l y 
what s i g n s i n d i c a t e t h a t one i s c a l l e d to such a l i f e ; r a t i o n a l i z e s the 
contemplative c a l l i n g ; r e v i l e s with c o n s i d e r a b l e gusto those o f the a c t i v e 
l i f e who dare to q u e s t i o n the contemplative's mode o f l i v i n g ; and a t t a c k s 
pseudo-contemplatives. Everywhere the Cloud author's l i t e r a r y s k i l l s are 
e v i d e n t : m a s t e r f u l examples o f metaphor, w i t , sarcasm, i r o n y , f l i g h t s o f 
enthusiasm, and a l l i t e r a t i o n abound. Yet w h i l e the Cloud author's renown 
may r e s t on t h i s work, the t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f o r h i s w r i t i n g and, indeed, a 
d i s p l a y o f h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l and t h e o l o g i c a l " c r e d e n t i a l s " are to be found 
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i n e x p l i c i t l y the most advanced o f h i s s p i r i t u a l t r e a t i s e s , " The Book of 
Privy Counselling. 
The Book of Privy Counselling was w r i t t e n , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , to respond 
to q u e s t i o n i n g and c r i t i c i s m o f The Cloud of Unknowing. While the l a t t e r 
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work i s l o n g on advice f o r meditative technique. P r i v y Counselling e l o q u e n t l y 
advocates a metaphysical p o s i t i o n which l a r g e l y forms the t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s 
f o r t h i s technique. T h i s metaphysical p o s i t i o n depends g r e a t l y on the d i s -
t i n c t i o n between essence and e x i s t e n c e , a d i s t i n c t i o n which has g e n e r a l l y 
been i g n o r e d by those who have commented on, c r i t i c i z e d , o r i n t e r p r e t e d the 
works o f the Cloud author. 
The contemplative, argues the Cloud author, s h o u l d concentrate h i s 
t h i n k i n g and h i s f e e l i n g on h i s e x i s t e n c e ("that h i m s e l f i s " ) r a t h e r than 
on h i s essence ("what h i m s e l f i s " ) i f he wishes to advance on the path to 
m y s t i c a l union with God. This technique, while u n d e r l y i n g The Cloud of 
Unknowing, i s not expounded upon t h e r e . Although t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n may seem 
a b s t r u s e , i t i s , as I hope to demonstrate, fundamental to an understanding 
o f the Cloud author. 
D e s p i t e the Cloud author's a s s e r t i o n s t h a t h i s teachings are simple, i t 
i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t many are i n t i m i d a t e d by those t e a c h i n g s . To comprehend 
The Book of Privy Counselling on f i r s t r e a d i n g would r e q u i r e a good sense o f 
c l a s s i c a l and mediaeval metaphysical terminology, some awareness o f the 
mediaeval debate on the d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and e x i s t e n c e , and a 
r e a l i z a t i o n o f the c e n t r a l i t y o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n to c e r t a i n mainstream forms 
o f mediaeval mysticism. The modern reader might take some comfort from the 
f a c t t h a t some o f the Cloud author's contemporaneous audience a l s o found h i s 
work d i f f i c u l t . However, the modern reader may not l i k e the Cloud author's 
e s t i m a t i o n o f those who cannot understand him. He a t t a c k s and r i d i c u l e s 
h i s c r i t i c s u n m e r c i f u l l y , with t y p i c a l hyperbole, sarcasm, and condescending, 
i r o n i c i n c r e d u l i t y , while a t the same time o u t l i n i n g and defending h i s 
p o s i t i o n : " s o f t e l y [ q u i e t l y ] , mornyngly [sadly] and s m y l i n g l y I merveyle me 
sometyme whan I here sum men sey (I mene not simple l e w i d [uneducated) men 
and wommen, b o t c l e r k e s and men o f grete kunnyng [knowledge]) t h a t my w r i t y n g 
to thee and t o o t h e r i s so harde and so heigh, and so c u r i o u s and so q u e i n t e . " 
These c r i t i c s c l a i m h i s w r i t i n g to be so abstruse o r f a n c i f u l ("queinte") 
t h a t "unnethes [ s c a r c e l y ] i t may be c o n c e i v i d o f the s o t e l i s t c l e r k or w i t t e d 
[most i n t e l l i g e n t ] man o r womman." His d e t r a c t o r s , says the Cloud author, 
are i n f a c t so " b l e e n d i d " by t h e i r knowledge o f theology and t h e i r n a t u r a l 
i n t e l l i g e n c e ("here coryous kunnyng o f c l e r g i e and o f kynde")^ t h a t they 
cannot understand "the trewe c o n c e i t e o f t h i s l i g h t werk." I r o n i c a l l y , 
a c c o r d i n g to the Cloud author, h i s work '"schal be founden b o t a symple and 
a l i g h t l e s s o n o f [for] a lewid man." Not s a t i s f i e d with p l a c i n g h i s 
c r i t i c s below some o f the " l e w d i s t " and " b o i s t o u s e s t [ c r u d e s t ] " men o r women 
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who may accomplish the " l i t i l m a i s t r i e " necessary t o understand aspects o f 
h i s works, the Cloud author goes even f u r t h e r by l o c a t i n g these opponents 
below "the l e w d i s t kow o r unresonable b e e s t . " Even bovines, i t seems, 
u n l i k e h i s a d v e r s a r i e s , may at l e a s t " f e l e the [ t h e i r ] owne propre beyng" 
(137/4-30; 75/17-41; 76/1). 
That which i s "bot a symple and a l i g h t l e s s o n " i s the aforementioned 
d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and e x i s t e n c e : one must "thenk and f e l e t h a t 
h i m - s e l f i s , not what h i m - s e l f i s bot t h a t hym-self i s " (137/26-27; 76/38-
39). Primacy o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s g i v e n to e x i s t e n c e . While t h i s l e s s o n i s 
indeed simple the consequences are c e r t a i n l y not l i g h t — i f , as the Cloud 
author advocates, one bases one's way o f l i f e on i t . 
In o r d e r to demonstrate t h a t one may understand the Cloud author's 
" l e s s o n " by understanding h i s terms i t i s necessary t o d e f i n e h i s terms. 
These d e f i n i t i o n s may be o f value f o r a l l who wish t o read the Cloud author^ 
but who are not a l r e a d y w e l l - v e r s e d i n s c h o l a s t i c p h i l o s o p h y ' s treatment 
o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and e x i s t e n c e . The value o f the d e f i n i -
t i o n s o f terras o f f e r e d here i s c o n s i d e r a b l y enhanced by the f a c t , as we s h a l l 
see, t h a t a misunderstanding o f the Cloud author's terms i s imbedded i n the 
apparatus o f a l l the c r i t i c a l e d i t i o n s o f h i s t e x t s , a misunderstanding 
which may make the t e x t s incomprehensible to many. 
D e f i n i t i o n s o f metaphysical terms, as such, are not found w i t h i n the 
works o f the Cloud author. His are r h e t o r i c a l works o f metaphysical advocacy, 
s p i r i t u a l guidance, and contemplative technique, not metaphysical primers or 
commentaries. For d e f i n i t i o n s o f terminology one must go " o u t s i d e " the t e x t . 
By and l a r g e I w i l l go to S t Thomas Aquinas and A r i s t o t l e f o r d e f i n i t i o n s , 
c h i e f l y because the Cloud author makes, again and a g a i n , a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between essence and e x i s t e n c e . 
In the s c h o l a s t i c debate on t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n there were thre e b a s i c 
p o s i t i o n s : between essence and e x i s t e n c e there may be a formal, o r a mental, 
o r a r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n . This debate i t s e l f i s not the concern h e r e . 3 What 
i s o f concern i s t h a t the Cloud author's d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and 
e x i s t e n c e i s - u n e q u i v o c a l l y " r e a l . " I t i s the same p o s i t i o n as t h a t o f 
Aquinas. I t f o l l o w s t h a t i f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s " r e a l " f o r both o f them, 
t h e i r metaphysics should, i n g e n e r a l , be s i m i l a r , while others have noted 
the i n f l u e n c e o f Aquinas on the Cloud author i n a number of areas, no one, 
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to my knowledge, has demonstrated the c o n g r u i t y o f t h e i r metaphysics. 
A l s o , while the sources o f the theology o f the Cloud author have been w e l l 
e s t a b l i s h e d , the source o r sources o f h i s metaphysics have n o t . 5 The o n l y 
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evidence o f the Cloud author's d i r e c t knowledge o f Aquinas i s h i s r e f e r e n c e 
to "Seinte Thomas the Doctour" (PP 51/5-6; 102/36), unusual i n i t s e l f f o r a 
w r i t e r who mentions a u t h o r i t i e s only on very r a r e o c c a s i o n s . However, the 
" r e a l " d i s t i n c t i o n o f both authors, together w i t h the coherency which 
Aquinas's metaphysics (based on A r i s t o t e l i a n metaphysics) lends to The Book 
of Privy Counselling, makes Thomistic i n f l u e n c e , d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t , obvious 
The d i s t i n c t i o n o f the "what you a r e " from the " t h a t you a r e " i s a 
c l a s s i c a l m etaphysical d i s t i n c t i o n : "what man i s and that man i s , " wrote 
A r i s t o t l e , "are two d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . " 6 For d i f f e r e n t purposes, and i n 
many d i f f e r e n t ways, the making o f such a d i s t i n c t i o n i s common to mediaeval 
thought, and i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important t o mysticism. M a r t i n Heidegger 
a s s e r t s t h a t "The m y s t i c a l theology o f the Middle Ages, f o r example, t h a t 
o f M e i s t e r Eckhart, i s not even remotely a c c e s s i b l e without comprehension 
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o f the d o c t r i n e o f e s s e n t i a and e x i s t e n t i a . " T h i s b e i n g so (and the 
p r e s e n t study s h o u l d l e n d credence t o t h i s a s s e r t i o n ) , i t i s remarkable 
t h a t p r a c t i c a l l y no a t t e n t i o n has been p a i d t o t h i s d o c t r i n e i n s t u d i e s o f 
the Cloud a u t h o r . The g r e a t c l a r i t y which the Thomistic d o c t r i n e o f essence 
and e x i s t e n c e lends to The Book of Privy Counselling makes i t an obvious 
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m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f " e x i s t e n t i a l metaphysics" and the "metaphysical r e v o l u t i o n 
o f the Middle Ages — a r e v o l u t i o n from a c l a s s i c a l Greek e s s e n t i a l i s m to a 
C h r i s t i a n e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . 
L e t us f i r s t c o n s i d e r g e n e r a l l y some words and terms: "metaphysics," 
" b e i n g , " "essence," " e x i s t e n c e , " and " e x i s t e n t i a l metaphysics." L a t e r we 
s h a l l c o n s i d e r "being," "essence," and " e x i s t e n c e " i n more d e t a i l , t o g e t h e r 
w i t h " a c c i d e n t , " " q u a l i t y , " "substance," and "God." 
Metaphysics 
The most g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n o f "metaphysics" i s t h a t o f A r i s t o t l e : the 
study o f "being as b e i n g " — b e i n g as such (Methaphysics 4.1 1003a). A 
b e i n g i s a n y t h i n g , m a t e r i a l o r i m m a t e r i a l , which i n any way was, i s , o r w i l l 
be. Metaphysics i s the " u n i v e r s a l " s c i e n c e : a l l o t h e r s c i e n c e s are s p e c i a l 
o r p a r t i c u l a r ; botany, f o r example, de a l s e x c l u s i v e l y with beings which are 
p l a n t s . Metaphysics d e a l s w i t h t h a t which rocks, p l a n t s , animals, and 
angels have i n common — b e i n g . In o r d e r to d i s t i n g u i s h between an 
i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g , and the a b s t r a c t n o t i o n o f being, Aquinas used two words: 
"ens," which r e f e r s to i n d i v i d u a l beings c o n s i d e r e d concretely as essences, 
and "esse," which r e f e r s t o b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d abstractly. A c c o r d i n g to 
Joseph Owens, i n an a r t i c l e fundamental to the p r e s e n t study, Aquinas's esse 
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i s b e s t rendered i n E n g l i s h as " e x i s t e n c e . " 1 0 Aquinas very o f t e n d e f i n e s 
i n d i v i d u a l c r e a t e d beings c o n s i d e r e d c o n c r e t e l y i n terms o f e s s e , or 
e x i s t e n c e : " n u l l a enim c r e a t u r a e s t suum esse, sed e s t habens e s s e " ["no 
cr e a t u r e i s i t s own e x i s t e n c e , but i s t h a t which has e x i s t e n c e " ] (Quodl. 
2 . 2 . 1 ) . 1 1 T h i s d e f i n i t i o n a l s o shows what Aquinas wished t o emphasize — 
tha t a l l beings have existence. In Aquinas's C h r i s t i a n metaphysics the verb 
"habere / to have" p r e d i c a t e s p a r t i c i p a t i o n w h i l e the verb "esse / to be" 
p r e d i c a t e s i d e n t i t y as i n the statement: "Deus d i c i t u r bonus e s s e n t i a l i t e r , 
q u i a e s t ipsum b o n i t a s ; creaturae autera d i c u n t u r bone p e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n e m , 
q u i a habent bonitatem" ["God i s c a l l e d good e s s e n t i a l l y , because God is 
goodness; c r e a t u r e s however are c a l l e d good through p a r t i c i p a t i o n because 
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they have goodness"] (Quodl. 2.2.1). Likewise, Aquinas does not say simply 
t h a t c r e a t u r e s " a r e , " b u t that they "have" e x i s t e n c e ; e x i s t e n c e i s con-
t i n g e n t . 
In the J u d a e o - C h r i s t i a n cosmogony there i s on l y one b e i n g which does not 
have e x i s t e n c e , b u t which is e x i s t e n c e : God. As a p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t , an 
i n d i v i d u a l human b e i n g may not know what God i s — t h a t i s beyond human 
c a p a c i t i e s — b u t because an i n d i v i d u a l human b e i n g e x i s t s , and because 
e x i s t e n c e comes from God, the p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t , through t h i n k i n g about and 
f e e l i n g h i s o r h e r e x i s t e n c e , both "knows" and " f e e l s " God. Aquinas teaches 
t h i s and t h i s i s what i s meant when i t i s s a i d t h a t i n h i s metaphysics 
Thomas Aquinas gives primacy to e x i s t e n c e . This does not mean t h a t e x i s t e n c e 
comes first, t h a t there i s some k i n d o f c h r o n o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y o f e x i s t e n c e 
over essence. Rather, i t i s a matter o f epistemology, u l t i m a t e l y a l l t h a t 
we may r e a l l y know i s e x i s t e n c e . T h i s too i s what the Cloud author c a l l s 
h i s "simple t e c h i n g . " We can see "beyng" c l e a r l y used i n i t s a b s t r a c t sense 
o f " e x i s t e n c e , " and primacy given t o t h i s term when the Cloud author p a r a l l e l s 
the statement t h a t one ought " f o r to thenk and f o r t o f e l e h i s owne propre 
beyng" (138/2-3; 77/3), with the statement t h a t one s h o u l d be a b l e t o "thenk 
and f e l e t h a t h i m - s e l f i s , not what h i m - s e l f i s , but t h a t hym-self i s " 
(137/26-27; 76/38-39). In t h i s passage we are t o l d t h a t even "the moste 
unresonable b e e s t " may " f e l e t h a t h i m - s e l f i s " o r i s able " f o r to f e l e h i s 
owne propre beyng" — i t s e x i s t e n c e — wh i l e man who i s "endowid w i t h reson" 
may a l s o "thenk" o f h i s e x i s t e n c e . 
E x i s t e n c e i s the f a c t o r common to each c r e a t e d b e i n g and God; essences 
d e f i n e : a d e f i n i t i o n o f " t r e e " o r " b i r d " i s a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the e s s e n t i a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a l l trees and b i r d s ; an e s s e n t i a l d e f i n i t i o n d e s c r i b e s 
what " t r e e n e s s " o r " b i r d n e s s " c o n s i s t s o f — the what q u e s t i o n i s the 
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e s s e n t i a l q u e s t i o n . The q u e s t i o n o f whether a p a r t i c u l a r b i r d o r t r e e 
e x i s t s i s the q u e s t i o n of e x i s t e n c e ; i t t e l l s us that something e x i s t s — 
t h i s i s the e x i s t e n t i a l q u e s t i o n . I f I not only gave prime c o n s i d e r a t i o n to 
the q u e s t i o n o f the e x i s t e n c e o f a being, p a r t i c u l a r l y my own being, but 
a l s o i n s i s t e d t h a t u l t i m a t e l y t h i s i s the only important q u e s t i o n , one c o u l d 
say that I was an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t — t h a t I gave primacy to e x i s t e n c e ; t h i s i s 
what Aquinas and the Cloud author do. I f I gave prime c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the 
whatness o f b e i n g s , o f d e s c r i b i n g what they are, as d i d A r i s t o t l e , one c o u l d 
say t h a t I was an e s s e n t i a l i s t — t h a t I gave primacy to essences. 
J u s t about any p h i l o s o p h e r would support the c l a i m t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e 
between the e s s e n t i a l q u e s t i o n and the e x i s t e n t i a l q u e s t i o n i s s i m p l e . 
A r i s t o t l e t r e a t e d i t as such (Posterior Analytics 2.8 92b). Heidegger says 
o f the " t h a t " and the "what" o f a b e i n g : "In the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n 
i t i s taken as s e l f - e v i d e n t . Everyone has t h i s i n s i g h t . " * 3 Aquinas says 
that o f a n y t h i n g "quia q u a e s t i o q u i d e s t s e q u i t u r ad quaestionem an e s t " 
["we cannot even ask what i t i s u n t i l we know t h a t i t e x i s t s " ] (ST l a . 2 . 
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2 ad.2 / 2:10-11). There i s , then, nothing s p e c t a c u l a r , or even unusual 
i n the Cloud author's drawing o f a t t e n t i o n to the f a c t t h a t f o r every b e i n g 
one may ask a "what" q u e s t i o n and a " t h a t " q u e s t i o n . What i s unusual, and 
perhaps more d i f f i c u l t to grasp, p a r t i c u l a r l y from a "modern" s c i e n t i f i c 
p o i n t o f view, o r from an A r i s t o t e l i a n p o i n t o f view, i s why the Cloud author 
would t e l l h i s d i s c i p l e t o f o r g e t the "what" q u e s t i o n and t o c o n s i d e r o n l y 
the " t h a t " q u e s t i o n . The answer u n d e r l i n e s the d i f f e r e n c e between c r e a t i o n -
i s t and n o n - c r e a t i o n i s t metaphysics, the d i f f e r e n c e between c l a s s i c a l Greek 
and C h r i s t i a n metaphysics. 
Because o f the d o c t r i n e o f c r e a t i o n , and the dependent r e l a t i o n s h i p 
o f c r e a t e d beings to the c r e a t i n g Being, C h r i s t i a n metaphysics must con-
s i d e r a b l y modify c l a s s i c a l metaphysics. For the c l a s s i c a l Greeks c r e a t i o n 
out o f n o t h i n g i s i r r a t i o n a l and i m p o s s i b l e , and the very d e f i n i t i o n o f a 
b e i n g r e s t s on i t s independence.*^ For the C h r i s t i a n there must be an 
a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e i n k i n d between the Being and i t s dependent c r e a t e d 
b e i n g s . In C h r i s t i a n i t y , the Being (God), who i s "Being" o r e x i s t e n c e i t -
s e l f , c r e a t e d o t h e r b e i n g s . T h i s i s a " f a c t " : "omne esse, quocumque modo 
s i t , e s t a Deo" ["every e x i s t i n g t h i n g , i n whatever way i t may be, i s from 
God"] (SCG 3.7.1918).* 6 Man, l i k e a l l beings i n the C h r i s t i a n u n i v e r s e 
o f Aquinas, has from the Being, God, i t s esse, o r e x i s t e n c e . Each be i n g 
i s t h a t which has e x i s t e n c e ; God gives beings e x i s t e n c e and s u s t a i n s them i n 
e x i s t e n c e . In t h i s metaphysics existence and dependence are key words i n 
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c o n s i d e r i n g b e i n g s . For the Greeks essence and independence are the key 
words. In d i s c u s s i n g P l a t o ' s Parmenides R.E. A l l e n s u c c i n c t l y summarizes 
t h i s p o s i t i o n : "Both P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e suppose t h a t t o be r e a l i s t o be 
i n t e l l i g i b l e , and t h a t to be i n t e l l i g i b l e i s to be, o r to be possessed o f , 
essence o r form. They a l s o suppose t h a t to be r e a l i s to be independent 
and o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r , t h a t i s , able t o e x i s t a p a r t from o t h e r t h i n g s . " 1 7 
For the c l a s s i c a l Greek essence o r "whatness" i s o f primary importance; f o r 
the C h r i s t i a n e x i s t e n c e o r "thatness." The u l t i m a t e concern f o r Aquinas i s 
the source o f e x i s t e n c e , "he" who does not have e x i s t e n c e but who i s e x i s t e n c e , 
who t o l d Moses t h a t h i s name was "I AM" (Exod. 3:14), the unc r e a t e d b e i n g , 
God, e x i s t e n c e p e r se. The Cloud author m i r r o r s the A q u i n i a n concern and 
me t a p h y s i c a l assumptions when he w r i t e s : " a l i t i s h i d and e n s t o r i d i n 
t h i s l i t i l worde IS" (143/26; 80/38-9). 
I t may s u r p r i s e those who c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e Aquinas w i t h A r i s t o t l e , a 
view p o p u l a r e a r l i e r i n t h i s century, t h a t t h i s T h o m i s t i c , C h r i s t i a n meta-
p h y s i c s f i n d s i t s r o o t s i n Neoplatonism. J u s t as the Cloud a u t h o r chides 
the d i s c i p l e f o r t h i n k i n g too much on the "what," so Aquinas g e n t l y c r i t i -
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c i z e s the " a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s , " p a r t i c u l a r l y A r i s t o t l e : "A p r x n c i p i o 
enim q u a s i g r o s s i o r e s e x i s t e n t e s , non exi s t i m a b a n t esse e n t i a n i s i corpora 
s e n s i b i l i a " ["Somewhat raw to b e g i n w i t h , they reckoned t h a t the o n l y 
r e a l i t i e s were s e n s i b l e bodies") (ST la.44.2 / 8:10-11). F o r t u n a t e l y , 
it 19 " a l i q u i / o t h e r s , t h a t i s , the N e o p l a t o n i s t s , " u l t e r i u s . . . erex e r u n t 
se ad considerandum ens inquantum e s t ens, e t con s i d e r a v e r u n t causam rerum, 
non solum secundum quod sunt haec v e l t a l i a , sed secundum quod su n t e n t i a " 
[ " l a t e r . . . climbed h i g h e r t o the pro s p e c t o f b e i n g as b e i n g , and observed 
the cause o f things inasmuch as they are beings, not merely as t h i n g s o f 
such a k i n d o r q u a l i t y " ) (ST la.44.2 / 8:12-13). Because o f the r e v e l a t i o n 
o f c r e a t i o n , C h r i s t i a n metaphysicians must c o n s i d e r beings i n the l i g h t o f 
"the cause o f t h i n g s , " something the N e o p l a t o n i s t s , adapting A r i s t o t e l i a n 
c a u s a l i t y to t h e i r own ends, t h a t i s , extending i t to the i m m a t e r i a l realm, 
had a l r e a d y d o n e . 2 0 Adapted by C h r i s t i a n N e o p l a t o n i s t s , such as the Pseudo-
D i o n y s l u s , t h i s approach t o b e i n g i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f T h o m i s t i c meta-
p h y s i c s . 
Inst e a d o f Socrates b e i n g a mutable, i m p e r f e c t copy o f some immutable, 
independently e x i s t i n g , concept-object c a l l e d "humanness," as P l a t o n i s t s 
might have i t , Aquinas c r y s t a l l i z e d the Neoplatonic r e l a t i o n o f the many 
emanating from the One — cr e a t u r e s are r e l a t e d to God as the e f f e c t i s 
r e l a t e d to the cause. As we have al r e a d y seen (and s h a l l expand upon l a t e r ) , 
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the key word i n Aquinas's d e f i n i t i o n o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s esse. For 
the purposes o f understanding C h r i s t i a n e x i s t e n t i a l metaphysics a l l we need 
bear i n mind i s t h a t a cr e a t e d b e i n g i s something which has e x i s t e n c e from 
another: "omne quod quocumque modo e s t a Deo e s t " ["everything t h a t i n 
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any way i s , i s from God"] (ST la.44.1 / 8:6), and " f o r t h a t thou a r t e 
thou hast of him" (144/10; 81/8). A human be i n g , then, l i k e a l l c r e a t u r e s , 
i s " i d quod f i n i t e p a r t i c i p a t e s s e " ["that which f i n i t e l y p a r t i c i p a t e s i n 
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e x i s t e n c e " ] (In Lib. de Causis 6.1.6.175), o r God " i s t h i b e i n g , and i n 
him thou a r t e t h a t a t [that] thou a r t e " (136/10;75/31-2), and " f o r t h a t 
thou a r t e thou hast o f him and he i t is" (144/10-11; 81/8,' emphasis added) . 
The p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the P l a t o n i c t r a d i t i o n i s C h r i s t i a n i z e d and e x i s t e n t i a l -
i z e d . E x i s t e n c e emanates from God as l i g h t from the sun; the h e l i o t r o p e , 
the metaphor o f the sun and i t s l i g h t , which so r e a d i l y conveys both the 
conc e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n between p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i d e n t i t y , as w e l l as the 
concept o f i d e n t i t y through p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i s a f a v o u r i t e o f the C h r i s t i a n 
N e o p l a t o n i c t r a d i t i o n and o f Aquinas: 
Se habet omnis c r e a t u r a ad Deum s i c u t a er ad solem i l l u m i n a n t e m . 
S i c u t enim s o l e s t lucens p e r suam naturam, aer autem f i t 
luminosus p a r t i c i p a n d o lumen a s o l e , non tamen p a r t i c i p a n d o 
naturam s o l i s , i t a s o l u s Deus e s t ens p e r essentiam suam, q u i a 
ejus e s s e n t i a e s t suum esse; omnis autem c r e a t u r a e s t ens p a r t i c i -
p a t i v e , non quod sua e s s e n t i a s i t ejus e s s e . [Every c r e a t u r e 
stands i n r e l a t i o n t o God as the a i r t o the l i g h t o f the sun. 
For as the sun i s l i g h t - g i v i n g by i t s very nature, w h i l e the a i r 
comes to be l i g h t e d through s h a r i n g i n the sun's nature, so a l s o 
God alone i s being by h i s essence, which i s h i s esse, w h i l e every 
c r e a t u r e i s being p a r t i c i p a t i v e l y , i . e . , i t s essence i s not i t s 
esse.] (ST la.104.1 / 14:42-43) 
Non-divine c r e a t e d being, f o r both Aquinas and the Cloud author, i s c l e a r l y 
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ens participatum, p a r t i c i p a t i n g b e i n g : " R e l i n q u i t u r ergo quod omnia a l i a 
a Deo non s i n t suum esse, sed p a r t i c i p a n t esse ["We are l e f t w ith the con-
c l u s i o n t h a t a l l things o t h e r than God are not t h e i r own e x i s t e n c e but 
share e x i s t e n c e " ] (ST la.44.1 / 8:6-7) . 
Being 
We have a l r e a d y seen t h a t "being" has d i f f e r e n t senses; Aquinas 
f o l l o w i n g A r i s t o t l e (Metaphysics 1026) was a c u t e l y aware o f t h i s . So too 
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i s che cloud author, and so must we be i f we are to understand h i s meta-
p h y s i c s . We have a l r e a d y noted above an i n s t a n c e i n which "beyng" i s 
u n e q u i v o c a l l y used i n the abstract sense o f e x i s t e n c e as r e v e a l e d by the 
p a r a l l e l p hrases: man must "thenk and f e l e t h a t h i m - s e l f i s " (137/26-7; 
76/38-9) and ought " f o r to thenk and f o r to f e l e h i s owne propre beyng" 
(138/2-3; 77/3). T h i s use o f the word "being" i s l i k e l y t o be a stumbling 
bloc k f o r many modern readers who, when they are t o l d t o t h i n k o f " t h e i r 
b e i n g , " w i l l g i v e , l i k e A r i s t o t l e , prime c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the concrete sense 
o f b e i n g — t h e i r whatness o r essence — r a t h e r than t o t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s c o n f u s i o n extends to the apparatus o f c r i t i c a l 
e d i t i o n s o f the works o f the Cloud author. In both t h e i r g l o s s a r i e s and 
notes these e d i t i o n s , a l l e d i t e d by P h y l l i s Hodgson, sometimes suggest t h a t 
the word "b e i n g " be understood as "essence"; sometimes as " e x i s t e n c e " ; 
sometimes as "essence" o r " e x i s t e n c e " ; and sometimes as ha v i n g another-mean-
i n g o r o t h e r meanings. This i s done without any attempt t o e x p l a i n the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and e x i s t e n c e o r i t s importance. O f t e n 
P r o f e s s o r Hodgson's choice o f e x p l a n a t i o n o f the word "b e i n g " i s simply 
wrong, and sometimes there i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the 1944 and 1982 
e d i t i o n s — "b e i n g , " i n one e d i t i o n , i s noted t o be "essence," and i n the 
oth e r , i t i s " e x i s t e n c e " ; t h e r e i s another case where the note changes 
from " e x i s t e n c e " t o " e n t i t i e s . " 
An example o f the s e r i o u s consequences o f t h i s e d i t o r ' s f a i l u r e t o come 
to terms w i t h the d i f f e r e n t senses o f "being" i s as f o l l o w s . In the s t a t e -
ment: "For he i s t h i ' b e i n g " (136/9-10; 75/31), "being" draws t h i s note i n 
the 1944 e d i t i o n : "By being i s meant the centre o f the s o u l , the essence 
o f the s o u l , i t s apex, or ground o f the s p i r i t , o r the s y n t e r e s i s . A l l 
these a p p e l l a t i o n s mean the same t h i n g — i n modern terminology, the 'trans-
cendental s e l f "(205) . However, i f one continues r e a d i n g the passage noted, 
the sentence c i t e d itself r e v e a l s t h a t "being" i n t h i s case means " e x i s t e n c e " 
and not the " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s e l f . " That "being" here means " e x i s t e n c e " i s 
obvious i f one has mastered the " l i g h t l e s s o n " o f the d i f f e r e n c e between 
that and what "thou a r t . " The s i g n a l o f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s the r e p e t i t i o n 
o f the word " t h a t " i n the passage under n o t a t i o n : "For he i s t h i b e i n g , and 
i n him thou a r t e t h a t a t [that] thou a r t e " (136/9-10,-75/31-2): " t h a t a t " o r 
"that t h a t " may on l y r e f e r to "thatness" o r e x i s t e n c e ( t h i s c i t a t i o n w i l l 
be d e a l t w i t h more f u l l y below). 
While the 1944 note i s wrong, the 1982 note s k i r t s the q u e s t i o n . Here 
the note i s to f o u r t e e n l i n e s b e g i n n i n g with the passage j u s t c i t e d , and i n 
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which the word "being" o r "beinges" appears eleven times, o f t e n i n 
seemingly p a r a d o x i c a l f a s h i o n , f o r example, "he i s t h i b e i n g and thou not 
h i s " (136/15-16; 75/37). I f , as I argue, "being" here means " e x i s t e n c e , " 
the meaning o f t h i s passage i s : "You have your e x i s t e n c e from God not v i c e 
v e r s a . " Hodgson, however, o f f e r s a u n i v e r s a l d e f i n i t i o n o f "being": "Being 
connotes both ' e x i s t e n c e ' and 'essence'; i n God both are one" (note 75/31-
76/6, 176) . While t h i s statement i s o f course c o r r e c t i t c e r t a i n l y does not 
c l a r i f y the passage b e i n g noted, whose meanings (and seeming paradoxes) 
depend on the p l a y with the concrete and abstract senses o f "being" and the 
d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s o f these senses to each o t h e r i n c r e a t u r e s and i n God, 
hence o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s and d i f f e r e n c e between c r e a t u r e s and God. 
Without a c l e a r understanding o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between the senses o f the 
word " b e i n g , " the o b j e c t o f the word p l a y w i l l be missed, and the e l e v e n 
uses o f "being" i n t h i s s h o r t passage w i l l o n l y cause c o n f u s i o n . With an 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the d i f f e r e n c e between "thatness" and "whatness," t h i s 
passage from The Book of Privy Counselling i s a c c e s s i b l e ; without i t , i t 
i s i n d e e d " c u r i o u s and q u e i n t e . " 
Substance 
There i s a p a r a l l e l and r e l a t e d problem w i t h the Cloud author's use o f 
the word "substaunce." As with the word "being," modern r e a d e r s , l i k e 
mediaeval r e a d e r s , have an i n c l i n a t i o n to equate the term "substance" w i t h 
"essence." I f they do so The Book of Privy Counselling becomes more and 
more " c u r i o u s . " U n f o r t u n a t e l y , such an e q u a t i o n between substance and 
essence i s drawn i n the c r i t i c a l e d i t i o n s o f the Cloud author's works. 
A core s e c t i o n o f Privy Counselling comprises an exegesis o f the words 
o f Solomon i n Proverbs 3:9: "Worschip t h i Lorde w i t h t h i substaunce, and 
w i t h the f i r s t o f t h i f r u t e s fede thou the p o r e " (140/13-14; 78/26-27) . 
The e x e g e s i s i s based on a metaphysical sense o f "substance," which i n the 
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notes to her e d i t i o n s P h y l l i s Hodgson suggests should be read as "essence." 
I f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n were c o r r e c t , then the Cloud author would be a s s i g n -
i n g h i s d i s c i p l e the c o n t r a d i c t o r y task o f "worschiping God with thy essence" 
w h i l e a t the same time i n s i s t i n g t h a t he f o r g e t t h a t very essence ("think 
not what thou a r t " ) . 
The f i r s t meaning o f "substance" given i n A r i s t o t l e ' s Metaphysics 
(7.1028B) i s i n d e e d "essence." However, o n l y another meaning o f substance, 
t h a t i s , the meaning o f " h y p o s t a s i s " o r " f i r s t substance," such as appears 
i n A r i s t o t l e ' s Categories (5.2a.10), makes the Cloud author's exegesis o f 
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Proverbs 3:9 coherent and c o n s i s t e n t . I t may seem p r o p h e t i c f o r readers o f 
the c r i t i c a l e d i t i o n s o f The Book of Privy Counselling that Thomas Aquinas 
long ago warned t h a t the d i f f e r e n t senses o f "substance" could be a source 
of e r r o r ( " p o s i t esse e r r o r i s o c c a s i o " ) , because "nomen ' s u b s t a n t i a e , ' quod 
secundum p r o p r i e t a t e m s i g n i f i c a t i o n i s respondet 'h y p o s t a s i , ' a e q u i v o c a t u r 
apud nos, cum quandoque s i g n i f i c e t 'essentiam' quandoque 'hypostasim'" 
["the word 'substance,' which p r o p e r l y speaking corresponds i n meaning to 
'h y p o s t a s i s , ' i s e q u i v o c a l i n our usage, s i n c e i t r e f e r s sometimes to 
'essence' and sometimes to 'hypostasis'"] (ST la.29.2 ad 2 / 6:48-49). In 
the Cloud author's exegesis o f Proverbs 3:9 "substaunce" r e f e r s t o "hypo-
s t a s i s , " not to "essence" as Hodgson's t e x t s would have us understand. 
What i s the d i f f e r e n c e between "essence" and "h y p o s t a s i s " ? Consider 
the statement: "John i s a human b e i n g . " "John" i s the s u b j e c t and "human 
b e i n g " i s the p r e d i c a t e . John, because he i s an i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n t , an 
independent "being" ( i n the q u a l i f i e d C h r i s t i a n sense), i s an " h y p o s t a s i s " 
o r a "suppositum," which i n A r i s t o t l e and Aquinas i s a l s o c a l l e d "primary 
substance." John i s a s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g "substance" which supports h i s 
" a c c i d e n t s , " such as where he may l i v e , what c o l o u r h i s s k i n may be, o r 
how t a l l he may be. I f John were a d i s c i p l e o f the Cloud author he would 
be urged t o t h i n k o n l y o f h i s "substaunce" i n r e l a t i o n t o the word " i s " ; 
to t h i n k o n l y o f the statement "John i s " : the e x i s t e n t i a l o r " t h a t " 
statement. He would be t o l d not to c o n s i d e r such thoughts as "John i s a 
man, white, f i v e f e e t ten, and l i v e s i n Montreal": t h i s i s the b e g i n n i n g 
o f the e s s e n t i a l statement which d e f i n e s what John i s . However, i n 
A r i s t o t e l i a n and T h o m i s t i c metaphysics the word "man" i n the statement "man 
i s a r a t i o n a l a n imal" may a l s o be considered a "substance" — a secondary 
substance. Here "man" i s used t o begin d e f i n i n g the p r i n c i p l e s o f the 
s p e c i e s "man" — an essence. "Man" no lo n g e r r e f e r s o n l y t o one i n d i v i d u a l 
o f the s p e c i e s , but the ge n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o r essence o f "humanity." 
The Cloud author i n The Book of Privy Counselling, unless one accepts 
t h a t the t e x t may be n o n s e n s i c a l , does not use "substaunce" i n the sense o f 
"essence," but r a t h e r i n the sense o f " h y p o s t a s i s " : "subjectum v e l s u p p o s i -
tum quod s u b s i s t i t i n genere s u b s t a n t i a e " ["the s u b j e c t o r the u n d e r l y i n g 
t h i n g s u b s i s t i n g i n the category o f substance"] (ST la.29.2 / 6:48-49). For 
the Cloud author a substance i s a " t h i n g , " an i n d i v i d u a l b eing, which stands 
a l o n e . "Nam ens d i c i t u r q u a s i ens habens, hoc autem solum e s t s u b s t a n t i a , 
quae s u b s i s t i t " ["For b e i n g means something having e x i s t e n c e , but i t i s 
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substance alone which s u b s i s t s " ] (In 12 Meta. 2419) . The c o l o u r o f 
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John's s k i n , may a l s o be c a l l e d a "being" because i t too has e x i s t e n c e , 
but i t does not s t a n d alone, i t e x i s t s i n John; i t i s not a substance or 
h y p o s t a s i s , i t i s an a c c i d e n t , a term t o be d e a l t w i t h l a t e r i n more d e t a i l . 
We s h o u l d a l s o keep i n mind t h a t i n C h r i s t i a n metaphysics a l l hypostases, 
except God, do not r e a l l y support themselves, they are c r e a t e d and main-
t a i n e d i n e x i s t e n c e by God. But when the Cloud author w r i t e s i n The Book 
of Privy Counselling, "worschip unto God w i t h t h i substaunce and f o r to 
o f f r e up t h i n a k i d beyng, the whiche i s the first o f t h i f r u t e s " (142/2-3; 
79/29-30, emphasis added), we should understand "substaunce" as " s u b s t a n t i a 
p rima" [ " f i r s t substance"] (In 5 Meta. 903; a l s o , 7.1273), as "nakid 
beyng," as an h y p o s t a s i s considered without a c c i d e n t s , " s u b s t a n t i a e s t hoc 
primum i n t e r omnia e n t i a " ["substance i s the primary k i n d o f being'] (In 4 
Meta. 546), the " f i r s t o f t h i f r u t e s " : "thus maist thou se t h a t the f i r s t 
and the poynte o f t h i b e h o l d i n g i s moste s u b s t a n c i a l y s e t i n the n a k i d s i g h t 
and the blynde f e l y n g o f t h i n owne b e i n g . And thus i t i s o n l y t h i b e i n g 
t h a t i s the f i r s t o f t h i f r u t e s " (141/23-26; 79/22-24). 
The f i n a l p r o o f t h a t the sense o f " f i r s t " o r "primary substance" o r 
" h y p o s t a s i s , " and not "essence," i s intended i n the Cloud author's exegesis 
of "substaunce" i n Proverbs 3:9-10, "'Worschip t h i Lorde w i t h t h i substaunce, 
and w i t h the f i r s t o f t h i f r u t e s fede thou the pore'" (140/13-14; 78/26-27), 
i s t h a t i t makes the f o l l o w i n g passages coherent: " A l l e the y i f t e s o f kynde 
[nature] and o f grace . . . I clepe hem t h i f r u t e s " (140/28-29; 78/40-41), 
but "The f i r s t e y i f t i n i c h e c r e a t u r e i s o n l y the b e i n g o f the same 
c r e a t u r e " (141/3-4; 79/3-4), and the d i s c i p l e s h o u l d "do h o l e worschip 
unto God w i t h t h i substaunce and f o r t o o f f r e up t h i n a k i d beyng, the whiche 
i s the f i r s t o f t h i f r u t e s " (142/1-3; 79/29-31) . The " f i r s t o f t h i f r u t e s " 
i s your "nakid beyng"; your "nakid beyng" i s your "primary k i n d o f b e i n g " ; 
your "primary k i n d o f b e i n g " i s "your substaunce," and a l l o f these can be 
understood as t h a t which, a c c o r d i n g to the Cloud author, should be o f prime 
importance b e f o r e a l l e l s e — your i n d i v i d u a l human e x i s t e n c e . 
A c c i d e n t s 
In the "nine and f o u r t i c h a p i t r e " (CU 92-93;51) o f The Cloud of 
Unknowing, the Cloud author makes an analogy based on the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the A r i s t o t e l i a n c a t e g o r i e s o f b e i n g : "substaunce" and "accydentes." 
However, i n The Book of Privy Counselling, which post-dates The Cloud of 
Unknowing, the author, w h i l e f r e q u e n t l y u s i n g the word "substaunce," does 
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not use the word "accydentes." Rather, again and again, he mentions one o f 
the a c c i d e n t s : " q u a l i t e . " The o n l y other a c c i d e n t mentioned i s q u a n t i t y , 
and then not by name, and i n connection with q u a l i t y c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t o f 
the d e f i n i t i o n o f a t h i n g : "loke not how mochel ne how l i t i l t h a t i t be, 
ne charge not what i t i s ne what i t bemenith" (135/16-17; 75/14-16) . T h i s 
c o u l d imply t h a t the Cloud author i s c o n s i d e r i n g " q u a l i t e , " as w e l l as 
q u a n t i t y , i n the sense i n which the two are used i n formal l o g i c to d i s -
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t i n g u i s h c a t e g o r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . But there are a l s o sound o n t o l o g i c a l 
reasons f o r not mentioning the a c c i d e n t s o t h e r than q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y . 
In s c h o l a s t i c p h i l o s o p h y q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y are a b s o l u t e and i n t r i n s i c 
a c c i d e n t s , w h i l e the o t h e r seven are r e l a t i v e and e x t r i n s i c ; these l a t t e r 
are grounded i n the former. " Q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y alone modify the sub-
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stance i n i t s e l f . " Thus c o n s i d e r e d , these two a c c i d e n t s have a h i g h e r 
s t a t u s and importance. T h i s i s a l s o found i n A r i s t o t l e (Metaphysics 12, 
1069a-19). The Cloud author wants the d i s c i p l e t o f o r g e t what he i s ; he , 
would c o n s i d e r i t unnecessary o r su p e r f l u o u s to t e l l him to f o r g e t where o r 
when he i s , o r to f o r g e t any o f the o t h e r r e l a t i v e or e x t r i n s i c a c c i d e n t s . 
A r i s t o t l e w r i t e s : "I c a l l ' q u a l i t y * that i n v i r t u e o f which some t h i n g s 
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are s a i d to be such and such." In h i s Metaphysics (5.14, 1020a,33-1020b, 
25), the S t a g i r i t e e l a b o r a t e s on the v a r i o u s senses o f " q u a l i t y . " Aquinas 
comments on these senses (In 5 Meta. 987-996). To summarize Aquinas: 
q u a l i t i e s answer the q u e s t i o n "what s o r t " o r "what k i n d " ; q u a l i t i e s r e f e r 
t o the d e f i n i t i o n o f a b e i n g . As mentioned above, a l l the a c c i d e n t s con-
s i d e r e d as "beings" have a s t a t u s i n f e r i o r t o substances. T h i s i n f e r i o r 
s t a t u s o f a l l a c c i d e n t s i s a l s o d i s c u s s e d by Aquinas i n the Summa: 
Formae autem e t a c c i d e n t i a e t a l i a hujusmodi non d i c u n t u r e n t i a 
q u a s i i p s a s i n t , sed q u i a e i s a l i q u i d e s t ; u t albedo ea r a t i o n e 
d i c i t u r ens, q u i a ea subjectum e s t album. Unde, secundum 
Philosophum, accidens magis p r o p r i e d i c i t u r ' e n t i s ' quam 'ens'. 
[As f o r forms and m o d i f i c a t i o n s and the l i k e , you do not speak 
o f them as beings as though they themselves were t h i n g s , b u t 
because they a f f e c t t h i n g s ; f o r i n s t a n c e , the reason why you 
c a l l whiteness r e a l i s t h a t by i t a s u b j e c t i s w h i t e . Hence, 
to c i t e A r i s t o t l e , we say that a m o d i f i c a t i o n i s more f i t t i n g l y 
c a l l e d 'of a b e i n g ' than 'a being'.] (ST la.45.4 / 8:40-41) 
I t i s "more f i t t i n g " o r c o r r e c t to c a l l a q u a l i t y "of a b e i n g " (entis), than 
"a b e i n g " (ens), f o r a q u a l i t y i s a dependent b e i n g . I f we say " t h a t man i s 
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w i s e , " "wisdom" i s a q u a l i t y o f "that man." The "wisdom" has e x i s t e n c e 
(habet e s s e ) , o r i n some way the "wisdom" i s , and hence i t has, o r i s , a 
"being." But i n A r i s t o t e l i a n and s c h o l a s t i c metaphysics, and i n the meta-
p h y s i c s o f the Cloud author (as can be i n f e r r e d by comparing the Cloud 
author's much repeated use o f " q u a l i t e " i n The Book of Privy Counselling), 
a q u a l i t y has a l e s s e r k i n d o f b e i n g . Because i t i s not i t s own b e i n g , 
because i t e x i s t s i n another being, a q u a l i t y i s " i n f e r i o r " t o a substance: 
"Omne acci d e n s secundum suum esse e s t i n f e r i u s s u b s t a n t i a q u i a s u b s t a n t i a 
e s t ens p e r s e , a c c i d e n s autem i n a l i o " ["As a category o f r e a l i t y a q u a l i t y 
i s i n f e r i o r t o substance because substance i s a r e a l t h i n g i n i t s own r i g h t , 
a c c i d e n t i s r e a l o n l y i n another"] (ST 2a.2ae.23.3 ad 3 / 34:16-17; a l s o 
la.29.1; l a . 2 8 . 2 ) . 
Understanding the i n f e r i o r s t a t u s o f " q u a l i t y " i n the metaphysics 
a v a i l a b l e t o him makes c l e a r e r statements o f the Cloud author such as "bere 
up t h i seek s e l f as thou a r t e unto g r a c i o u s God as he i s , with-outyn any 
c o r i o u s o r s p e c i a l beholdyng to eny o f a l l e the q u a l i t e e s t h a t longyn to 
the beyng o f t h i - s e l f o r o f God" (139/7-10; 77/35-37). The d i s c i p l e must 
contemplate o n l y h i s substance; never s h o u l d he waste h i s time on a c c i d e n t s . 
Essence 
I t was argued above t h a t the sense o f "substaunce" used by the Cloud 
author i n The Book of Privy Counselling s h o u l d not be confused w i t h "essence" 
even though t h i s i s one o f i t s senses: "Uno modo d i c i t u r s u b s t a n t i a q u i d -
d i t a s r e i quam s i g n l f i c a t d e f i n i t i o secundum quod diclmus quod d e f i n i t i o 
s i g n i f i c a t substantiam r e i ; quam quidem substantiam G r a e c i 'usiam' v o c a n t , 
quod nos 'essentiam 1 d i c e r e possumus" ["In one sense we c a l l 'substance' 
the whatness o f a t h i n g ; t h i s i s what a d e f i n i t i o n r e f e r s t o , as when we say 
t h a t we d e f i n e the substance o f a t h i n g . A c t u a l l y the Greek word f o r t h i s 
i s ' o u s i a , ' f o r which we may use the word 'essence'"] (ST la.29.2 / 6:48-49). 
In the same a r t i c l e , Aquinas e x p l a i n s "essence" i n more d e t a i l : " E s s e n t i a 
p r o p r i e e s t i d quod s i g n i f i c a t u r p e r d e f i n i t i o n e m . D e f i n i t i o autem comp-
l e c t i t u r p r i n c i p i a s p e c i e i , non autem p r i n c i p i a i n d i v i d u a l i a " ["Properly 
speaking the essence i s what i s expressed by the d e f i n i t i o n . A d e f i n i t i o n 
comprises p r i n c i p l e s o f the s p e c i e s but not i n d i v i d u a l p r i n c i p l e s " ] (ST 
la.29.2 ad 3 / 6:48-49). 3 0 For A r i s t o t l e , Aquinas, and the Cloud author 
essences do not e x i s t i n themselves. I may be a b l e to t e l l you what "man" 
i s and what "phoenix" i s by naming s p e c i f i c q u a l i t i e s , those q u a l i t i e s 
which be l o n g to the s p e c i e s "man" o r "phoenix"; I would d e f i n e "man" o r 
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"phoenix," s a y i n g "a man i s such and such" and "a phoenix i s such and such," 
but unless there i s an i n d i v i d u a l man o r phoenix i n which these q u a l i t i e s 
e x i s t , then "man" o r "phoenix" does not r e a l l y e x i s t . 
The f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n r e v e a l s q u i t e c l e a r l y the d i f f e r e n c e between 
"essence" and " e x i s t e n c e " : 
Omnia quae sunt i n genere uno communicant i n q u i d d i t a t e v e l 
e s s e n t i a g e n e r i s quod p r a e d i c a t u r de e i s i n eo quod q u i d . 
D i f f e r u n t autem secundum esse, non enim idem e s t esse hominis 
e t e q u i , nec hujus hominis e t i l l i u s hominis. E t s i c o p o r t e t 
quod quaecumque sunt i n genere d i f f e r a n t i n e i s esse e t quod 
q u i d e s t , i d e s t e s s e n t i a . [ A l l members o f a genus share one 
essence o r nature, t h a t of the genus s t a t i n g what they a r e . As 
e x i s t e n t s , however, they d i f f e r , f o r a horse's e x i s t e n c e i s not 
a man's, and t h i s man's e x i s t e n c e i s not t h a t man's. So t h a t 
when something belongs to a genus, i t s essence, o r what i t i s , 
must d i f f e r from i t s e x i s t e n c e . ] (ST la.3.5 / 2:36-37) 3 1 
There i s a r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n o f man, i . e . , an 
essence, and the e x i s t e n c e o f the i n d i v i d u a l man i n the metaphysics o f 
Aquinas. T h i s , I would argue, i s the case as w e l l f o r the Cloud author, f o r 
w h i l e he does not use the word "essence" o r " s p e c i e s , " which i s a s p e c i f i c 
essence, he does use a Middle E n g l i s h e q u i v a l e n t o f " s p e c i e s " o r "genus," 
t h a t i s , " k i n d . " A t one p o i n t he d e f i n e s the essence o f the d i s c i p l e 
(while t e l l i n g him t h a t i n the s p i r i t u a l e x e r c i s e under d i s c u s s i o n t h i s i s 
to be f o r g o t t e n ) : "what thou a r t e : a man i n k i n d " (138/11; 77/11) -- the 
" k i n d " o f c r e a t u r e the d i s c i p l e belongs to i s "man." I t i s q u i t e c l e a r , 
Aquinas s t a t e s , t h a t "the p r i n c i p l e s o f the s p e c i e s " r e f e r t o an essence and 
not to an i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g ( S r la.29.2 ad 3 / 6:48-49); there i s no a l t e r -
n a t i v e to a c c e p t i n g t h a t the Cloud author i s making e x a c t l y t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . 
Contemplation o f essences which do not e x i s t i n themselves, he i s s a y i n g , i s 
a waste o f time and an impediment to e x p e r i e n c i n g m y s t i c a l u n i o n . 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l and the u n i v e r s a l i n t h i s 
metaphysics f i n d s i t s roots i n Neoplatonism. In the Prologue to h i s 
Commentary on the Divine Names of the Pseudo-Dionysius Aquinas makes a 
sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between the theory o f the r e a l i t y o f the i d e a s and the 
c a u s a l nature o f the F i r s t P r i n c i p l e . The P l a t o n i c theory o f ideas i s 
r e j e c t e d out o f hand as not agreeing with f a i t h o r t r u t h ( " r a t i o f i d e i non 
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consonat nec v e r i t a t i " ) . But as f a r as the F i r s t P r i n c i p l e o f things 
("primo rerum P r i n c i p i o " ) i s concerned, "quod e s t i p s a e s s e n t i a b o n i t a t i s 
e t u n i t a t i s e t esse, quod dicimus Deum e t quod omnia a l i a d i c u n t u r bona 
v e l una v e l e n t i a p e r derivationem ab i l l o primo" ["which i s i t s e l f the 
essence o f goodness and u n i t y and e x i s t e n c e , which we c a l l God and by which 
a l l o t h e r things are c a l l e d good o r one o r b e i n g by d e r i v a t i o n from t h a t 
f i r s t p r i n c i p l e " ] , i n t h i s " v e r i s s i m a e s t eorum o p i n i o e t f i d e i c h r i s t i a n a e 
consona" [ " t h e i r (the N e o p l a t o n i s t s ' ) o p i n i o n i s most true and i n accordance 
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w i t h C h r i s t i a n f a i t h " ] . Aquinas r e j e c t e d the P l a t o n i c concept o f the 
independent r e a l i t y o f forms (the essence "horse" o r " j u s t i c e " would r e a l l y 
e x i s t and the i n d i v i d u a l horse o r a c t o f j u s t i c e would be but a mutable and 
i n f e r i o r copy o f "horse" o r " j u s t i c e " ) , w h i l e a c c e p t i n g the Neoplatonic 
compromise o f forms, o r p r o t o t y p e s , o r i d e a s , somehow e x i s t i n g o r "pre-
e x i s t i n g , " as the Pseudo-Dionysius would put i t , i n the mind o f God. T h i s 
i n t u r n i s l i n k e d to the Neoplatonic a p p l i c a t i o n o f A r i s t o t e l i a n c a u s a l i t y 
to the problem o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f the One to the many. The many d e r i v e 
t h e i r e x i s t e n c e from the one essence whose essence i s not d i s t i n c t from i t s 
e x i s t e n c e , "the essence o f goodness and u n i t y and e x i s t e n c e , which we c a l l 
God." 
The r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and e x i s t e n c e f o r a l l beings b u t 
God i s e x p l i c i t i n The Book of Privy Counselling when the Cloud author w r i t e s 
t h a t God, u n l i k e man, "ben b o t one bothe i n substaunce and a l s o i n kynde" 
(169/30-170/1; 97/26). R e c a l l i n g t h a t "thatness" o r i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n c e 
has a fundamental equivalence with "substaunce," and t h a t "kynde" r e f e r s to 
"essence," the f o r e g o i n g statement o f the Cloud author i s i d e n t i c a l i n mean-
i n g to the f o l l o w i n g by Thomas Aquinas, the very core o f h i s metaphysics: 
"Solus Deus e s t ens p e r essentiam suam, q u i a ejus e s s e n t i a e s t suum esse" 
["God alone i s b e i n g by h i s essence, which i s h i s e s s e " ] . God's "whatness" 
is h i s " t h a t n e s s , " w h i l e , continues Aquinas, f o r c r e a t e d b e i n g our "whatness" 
i s not our " t h a t n e s s " : "Omnis autem c r e a t u r a e s t ens p a r t i c i p a t i v e , non 
quod sua e s s e n t i a s i t ejus esse." ["Every c r e a t u r e i s b e i n g p a r t i c i p a t i v e l y , 
i . e . , i t s essence i s not i t s esse"] (ST la.104.1 / 14: 42-43). I t i s f o r 
t h i s same reason, Aquinas w r i t e s elsewhere, that "Ens autem non p o n i t u r i n 
d e f i n i t i o n e c r e a t u r a e , q u i a nec e s t genus nec d i f f e r e n t i a . Unde p a r t i c i -
p a t u r s i c u t a l i q u i d non e x i s t e n s de e s s e n t i a r e i ; e t ideo a l i a q u a e s t i o e s t 
an e s t e t quid est" [" Being i s not p l a c e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f a c r e a t u r e , 
because i t i s n e i t h e r a genus nor a d i f f e r e n c e . Being i s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n as 
something not e x i s t i n g from the essence o f a t h i n g , and t h e r e f o r e the 
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q u e s t i o n whether a t h i n g i s , i s o t h e r than the q u e s t i o n what a t h i n g i s " ] 
(Ouodl. 2.3.1) . 
In the works o f the Cloud author we f i n d a mysticism based on 
" e x i s t e n c e . " A person who wishes to be " k n i t " t o God must t h i n k and f e e l 
t hat he i s , f o r he p a r t i c i p a t e s i n thatness, o r e x i s t e n c e , which emanates 
from God, o r , as a C h r i s t i a n must say, which God emanates. T h i s borrowing 
from Neoplatonism i s that which i s "new" i n the metaphysics o f Aquinas, a 
metaphysics which the Cloud author shares, and which d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e i r 
metaphysics from t h a t o f A r i s t o t l e . Aquinas i s w e l l aware o f how he and 
the S t a g i r i t e d i f f e r : 
A n t i q u i p h i l o s o p h i . . . non c o n s i d e r a v e r u n t n i s i emanationem 
effectuum p a r t i c u l a r ! u m a c a u s i s p a r t i c u l a r i b u s , quas necesse 
e s t praesupponere a l i q u i d i n sua a c t i o n e ; e t secundum hoc e r a t 
eorum communis o p i n i o , ex nihilo nihil f i t . Sed tamen hoc locum 
non habet i n prima emanatione ab u n i v e r s a l i rerum p r i n c i p i o . 
[The a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s c o n c e n t r a t e d t h e i r a t t e n t i o n on the 
emanation o f p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t s from p a r t i c u l a r causes. These, 
o f course, presuppose something to a c t on, and i n t h i s c o n t e x t 
the g e n e r a l reckoning was t h a t n o t h i n g comes from n o t h i n g . The 
axiom, however, does not apply to the o r i g i n a l emanation from 
the u n i v e r s a l source o f t h i n g s . ] (ST la.45.2 / 8 :30-31) 3 3 
This e x i s t e n c e which emanates from God deserves more d i r e c t s c r u t i n y . 
E x i s t e n c e 
For c r e a t e d beings e x i s t e n c e i s primary. God "gave thee to be" 
(141/15; 79/14), "The f i r s t y i f t i n i c h e c r e a t u r e i s o n l y the b e i n g o f the 
same c r e a t u r e " (141/3-4; 79/3-4), and the f a c t t h a t the c r e a t u r e i s a 
substance "the whiche was sumtyme nought" (144/12; 81/9-10) may be e x p l a i n e d 
by the f o l l o w i n g : " I l l i enim p r o p r i e c o n v e n i t esse quod habet e s s e , e t quod 
e s t s u b s i s t e n s i n suo esse" ["Only t h a t i s an e x i s t e n t , i n the p r o p e r sense 
o f the term, which has e x i s t e n c e and supports i t s own e x i s t e n c e " ] (ST 
la.45.4 / 8:40-41). T h i s i s a "substaunce." That which i s "nought i n 
substaunce" i s not r e a l l y a b e i n g " i n the proper sense o f the term." With-
out e x i s t e n c e — n o t h i n g . 
Domingo Banez commenting on Aquinas i n the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y : w r i t e s : 
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"esse i s t h a t by which a t h i n g i s c o n s t i t u t e d as o u t s i d e n o t h i n g n e s s . " 
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As a l r e a d y noted, the cornerstone o f C h r i s t i a n metaphysics i s "Deus ex 
n i h i l o r e s i n esse p r o d u c i t " ["God b r i n g s things i n t o e x i s t e n c e from nothing"] 
(ST la.45.2 / 8:30-31); hence "ipsum esse e s t quo s u b s t a n t i a denominatur 
ens" ["existence (esse) i s t h a t by which substance i s named b e i n g (ens)"] 
(SCG 2.54.1292). 3 5 In the sense o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , God i s i n man and man i s 
i n God. C o n s i d e r i n g "being" i n the sense o f esse, " e x i s t e n c e , " the f o l l o w i n g 
from The Book of Privy Counselling s t a t e s t h i s d o c t r i n e : "For he i s t h i 
b e i n g , and i n him thou a r t e t h a t a t thou a r t e , not o n l y b i cause and b i 
beyng, b o t a l s o he i s i n thee bothe t h i cause and t h i beyng" (136/9-11; 75/31-
3) . In t h i s statement " b i cause" r e f e r s to the w i l l e d c r e a t i v e a c t o f God, 
and " b i b e i n g " r e f e r s to the e f f e c t o f t h a t c a u s a l a c t , t h a t i s , the e x i s t e n t 
i n d i v i d u a l — i n t h i s case, the d i s c i p l e . The " t h i cause" and " t h i b e i n g " 
r e f e r t o the ongoing s u s t a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Cause (God) and 
the e f f e c t (the e x i s t e n t i n d i v i d u a l ) . Esse comes from, and i s the ongoing 
e f f e c t o f , God a l o n e . 3 6 God causes and s u s t a i n s e x i s t e n c e ; c r e a t e d beings 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n e x i s t e n c e . Because God i s c o n s t a n t l y c a u s i n g ("thi cause") 
and s u s t a i n i n g ("thi beyng") each i n d i v i d u a l b eing, "Deus to t u s e s t i n 
omnibus e t s i n g u l i s " ["God e x i s t s wholly i n each and e v e r y t h i n g " ] (ST la.8.2 
ad 3 / 2:116-17) . But t h i s does not mean t h a t man and God are i d e n t i c a l ; 
i f i t d i d we no longer have a t h e i s t i c metaphysics. I n the words o f 
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Aquinas's favoured N e o p l a t o n i c analogy: "Se habet omnis c r e a t u r a ad Deum 
s i c u t a e r ad solem i l l u m i n a n t e m " ["Every c r e a t u r e stands i n r e l a t i o n t o God 
as the a i r t o the l i g h t o f the sun") (ST la.104.1 / 14:42-43). But as the 
l i g h t o f the sun i s not i d e n t i c a l with the sun, so the e f f e c t i s not 
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i d e n t i c a l w i t h the cause. We can now understand t h a t there i s " t h i s 
d i f f e r e n c e betwix thee and him, t h a t he i s t h i b e i n g and thou not h i s . For 
t h o f i t be so t h a t a l l e thinges ben i n hym b i cause and b i beyng and he be i n 
a l l e t h i n g e s here cause and here being, y i t i n h i m - s e l f o n l y he i s h i s owne 
cause and h i s owne b e i n g " (136/15-18; 75/36-38, 76/1-2). T h i s i s the 
d o c t r i n e o f s u s t a i n i n g c r e a t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t i o n as taught by Aquinas and 
d e r i v e d , u l t i m a t e l y , from the P l a t o n i c t r a d i t i o n . 
I t i s here t h a t we see the Cloud author, Aquinas, the Pseudo-Dionysius, 
and Augustine s t a n d i n g on the same ground — N e o p l a t o n i c ground. I t i s here 
a l s o t h a t we see a p r i n c i p a l d i f f e r e n c e between C h r i s t i a n and pagan 
Neoplatonism. For the C h r i s t i a n , being o r e x i s t e n c e emanates from the w i l l 
o f God; God w i l f u l l y c r e a t e s , and He s u s t a i n s those t h i n g s which He has 
c r e a t e d i n e x i s t e n c e . For the pagan N e o p l a t o n i s t , "emanation" i s a r e s u l t 
39 
o f b l i n d n e c e s s i t y . 
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Esse, e x i s t e n c e , i s primary: "Ipsum enim esse e s t communissimus e f r e c t u s 
primus e t i n t i m i o r omnibus a l i i s e f f e c t i o n i b u s ; e t ideo s o l i Deo competit 
secundum v i r t u t e m t a l i s e f f e c t u s " ["For esse i s the most common o f a l l 
e f f e c t s , i t i s primary, more p e n e t r a t i v e than a l l o t h e r s ; hence i t belongs 
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to God alone as consonant w i t h h i s own power"]. Esse i s " t h i n a k i d 
beyng" (141/12; 79/12), and "the f i r s t poynte o f t h i s p i r i t " (143/9-10; 
80/23), and the " f i r s t o f t h i f r u t e s " (141/7-8; 79/7) . For the Cloud author 
and f o r Aquinas: "Esse autem e s t i l l u d quod e s t magis intimum c u i l i b e t e t 
quod p r o f u n d i u s omnibus i n e s t " ["Existence i s more i n t i m a t e l y and profoundly 
i n t e r i o r t o t h i n g s than anything e l s e " ] (la.8.1 / 2:112-13). But God i s 
e x i s t e n c e , without God there i s o n l y non-existence: nothing; and "Unde o p o r t e t 
quod Deus s i t i n omnibus rebus e t i n t i m e " ["So God must e x i s t and e x i s t 
i n t i m a t e l y i n e v e r y t h i n g " ] (ST la.8.1 / 2:112-13), and God " e s t i n omnibus 
rebus ut dans e i s esse e t v i r t u t e m e t operationem" ["is i n a l l t h i n g s g i v i n g 
them e x i s t e n c e , power and a c t i v i t y " ) (ST la.8.2 / 2:114-15). I t i s as e f f e c t 
t h a t "Deus tot u s e s t i n omnibus e t s i n g u l i s " ["God e x i s t s wholly i n each and 
every thing"] (ST la.8.2 ad 3 / 2:116-17), and i t i s because he i s an e f f e c t 
of God t h a t the Cloud author advocates t h a t the d i s c i p l e u t t e r the p r a y e r , 
"'That a t I am, Lorde, I o f f r e unto thee, f o r thou i t a r t e ' " (137/1-2; 
76/14) . 
This p r a y e r r e v e a l s how completely the Cloud author understands the 
T h o m i s t i c d o c t r i n e o f essence and e x i s t e n c e . E x i s t e n c e i s not essence, 
"thatness" i s not "whatness," so the Cloud author must use the word " t h a t " 
twice i n t h i s statement. He does not say "what I am" b u t " t h a t a t I am": 
" t h a t t h a t I am" i s t h a t which i s God i n him ("for thou i t a r t e " ) . There 
are many modes of being (multiplex modus essendi rerum): one f o r c o r p o r e a l 
c r e a t u r e s , another f o r i n c o r p o r e a l c r e a t u r e s ( a n g e l s ) , and another f o r God. 
An index which d i s t i n g u i s h e s between beings (creatures) and Being i s 
e x i s t e n c e . So f o r angels, w h i l e they have a mode o f b e i n g d i f f e r e n t from 
t h a t o f c o r p o r e a l c r e a t u r e s , "tamen non sunt suum esse, sed sunt esse 
habentes" ("existence i s s t i l l something they have, i t i s not what they are"] 
and " S o l i u s autem Dei p r o p r i u s modus essend i e s t u t s i t suum esse s u b s i s t e n s " 
[ " F i n a l l y t h e r e i s the way o f b e i n g t h a t belongs to God alone, f o r h i s 
e x i s t e n c e i s what he i s " ] (ST la.12.4 / 3:14-15) . Only f o r God are "what-
ness" and " t h a t n e s s " i d e n t i c a l : " D i v i n a e s s e n t i a e s t ipsum e s s e " ["The 
d i v i n e essence i s e x i s t e n c e i t s e l f " ) (ST la.12.2 ad 3 / 3:10-11) . 
159 
God 
One "problem" with the metaphysics o f the Cloud author which remains i s 
the " q u a l i t i e s " o f God. The Cloud author, as we have already' seen i n another 
context, i n s t r u c t s the d i s c i p l e to forgo "any c o r i o u s o r s p e c i a l beholdyng 
to eny o f a l l e the q u a l i t e e s t h a t longyn to the beyng o f t h i - s e l f o r o f 
God" (139/8-10; 77/35-37). But Aquinas says that " i n Deo accidens esse non 
p o t e s t " ["accidents cannot e x i s t i n God"] and then gives v a r i o u s reasons 
why God has no a c c i d e n t s , f o r example: "Quia Deus e s t suum esse, e t ut 
B o e t i u s d i c i t , l i c e t i d guod e s t , aliquid aliud possit habere adjunctum, 
tamen ipsum esse nihil aliud adjunctum habere potest" ["Because God i s h i s 
own e x i s t e n c e , and as Boethius says, you may add to an existent, but you 
cannot add to existence itself"] (ST la.3.6 / 2:38-39) . A c c o r d i n g to 
A q u i n i a n metaphysics, then, God has no a c c i d e n t s . Yet, a l s o a c c o r d i n g to 
Aquinas, the p e r f e c t i o n s o r the q u a l i t i e s t h a t e x i s t i n man a l s o e x i s t i n 
God, b u t i n a d i f f e r e n t way: "Omnes rerum p e r f e c t i o n e s quae sunt i n rebus 
c r e a t i s d i v i s i m e t m u l t i p l i c i t e r , i n Deo p r a e e x i s t u n t u n i t e e t s i m p l i c i t e r " 
["The p e r f e c t i o n s which i n c r e a t u r e s are many and v a r i o u s p r e - e x i s t i n God as 
one"] (ST la.13.5 / 3:64-65). 
When the Cloud author speaks o f the " q u a l i t e e s " o f God he i s speaking o f 
God i n the i m p e r f e c t manner of which c r e a t u r e s are capable, f o r a c c o r d i n g to 
Aquinas " i m p o s s i b i l e e s t a l i q u i d p r a e d i c a r i de Deo e t c r e a t u r i s univoce" 
[ " i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o p r e d i c a t e anything u n i v o c a l l y o f God and c r e a t u r e s " ] 
(ST la.13.5 / 3:62-63). We only use words to name God, such as those o f the 
Cloud author, "'Good' o r 'Faire Lorde', or 'Swete', ' M e r c i f u l , ' o r 'Right-
w i s e ' " (143/23; 80/35-36), because o f our l i m i t e d means, always r e a l i z i n g 
t h a t " I n t e l l e c t u s autem n o s t e r , cum cognoscat Deum ex c r e a t u r i s , format ad 
intellige.ndum Deum conceptiones p r o p o r t i o n a t a s p e r f e c t i o n i b u s procedentibus a 
Deo i n c r e a t u r a s . Quae quidem p e r f e c t i o n e s i n Deo p r a e e x i s t u n t u n i t e e t 
s i m p l i c i t e r , i n c r e a t u r i s vero r e c i p i u n t u r d i v i s e e t m u l t i p l i c i t e r " ("Since 
we know God from c r e a t u r e s we understand him through concepts a p p r o p r i a t e 
t o the p e r f e c t i o n s c r e a t u r e s r e c e i v e from him. What p r e - e x i s t s i n God i n a 
simple and u n i f i e d way i s d i v i d e d amongst cr e a t u r e s as many and v a r i e d 
p e r f e c t i o n s " ] (ST la.13.4 / 3:60-61). In enumerating such q u a l i t i e s , Aquinas 
c o n t i n u e s , we can only understand i m p e r f e c t l y "unura omnino simplex" ["some-
t h i n g a l t o g e t h e r simple"] (ST la.13.4 / 3:60-61) . So, a l s o , as he i s w e l l 
aware, the Cloud author when using such words as "Good" o r "Wisdom" o r "Love" 
to name o r d e f i n e God, i s speaking a n a l o g i c a l l y and i m p e r f e c t l y . For t h i s 
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reason he t e l l s the d i s c i p l e "to think apon the n a k i d beyng" (CU 25/10-11; 
14/11) o f God, because i f : 
Now thou askest me and s e i e s t : "How s c h a l I t h i n k on h i m - s e l f , and 
what i s hee?" And to t h i s I cannot answere thee b o t thus: "I 
wote never . . . ." For o f a l l e o t h e r c r e a t u r e s and t h e i r e werkes 
— ye, and o f the werkes o f God s e l f — may a man thorou grace 
have f u l h e e d o f knowing, and wel to kon thinke on hem; b o t o f 
God h i m - s e l f can no man t h i n k e . (CU 25/13-19; 26/1-2; 14/14-20) 
In Dionise Hid Divinite, the Cloud author's t r a n s l a t i o n o f Pseudo-
D i o n y s i u s ' Mystical Theology, we read t h a t God " i s aboven a l l e substaunce 
and a l maner knowyng" (DHD 3/12; 120/19-20); God i s "soveryn-substancyaly 
aboven," t r a n s c e n d i n g a l l "beyng t h i n g e s " (DHD 3/22-23;121/4-5). Aquinas 
might have been t h i n k i n g o f t h i s same source when he w r i t e s : " D i v i n a sub-
s t a n t i a omnem formam quam i n t e l l e c t u s n o s t e r a t t i n g i t , sua immensitate 
e x c e d i t : e t s i c ipsam apprehendere non possumus cognoscendo q u i d e s t " ["By 
i t s immensity, the d i v i n e substance surpasses every form t h a t our i n t e l l e c t 
r eaches. Thus we are unable to apprehend i t by knowing what it i s " ] (SCG 
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1.14.117) . 
We cannot know then what God i s , but we can know, i m p e r f e c t l y , o f the 
Cause through the e f f e c t s , o r , more p r e c i s e l y , "ex e i s i n hoc p e r d u c i possumus 
ut cognoscamus de Deo an e s t " ["we can a t l e a s t be l e d from them t o know o f 
God t h a t he e x i s t s " ] 1 S T la.12 .12 / 3i40-4J.),. In t h i s a r t i c l e , as elsewhere, 
we see the very d e l i b e r a t e c o n t r a s t o f " t h a t n e s s " (an est) and "whatness" 
(quid est) . Primacy i s given to "thatness" because, a c c o r d i n g t o Aquinas, 
the " t h a t n e s s " o r e x i s t e n c e o f God i s something which may be c l e a r l y known, 
while the "whatness" or essence o f God may not be known. So, a l s o , the 
Cloud author t e l l s us, we are not to mistake the e f f e c t s o r "doynges" f o r 
the cause, e i t h e r i n man o r God: "Many men clepen here doynges hem-self, 
and i t i s not so; f o r one am I t h a t do, and another aren my dedes t h a t ben 
done. And the same i t i s o f God; f o r one i s he i n h i m - s e l f , and another 
ben h i s werkes" (158/7-10; 90/18-21). We may not know the "what" o f God, 
but we may know the " t h a t " through God's e f f e c t s , and "Ipsum enim esse e s t 
communissimus e f f e c t u s primus e t i n t i m i o r omnibus a l i i s e f f e c t i b u s " ["Esse 
i s the most common of a l l e f f e c t s , i t i s primary, more p e n e t r a t i v e than a l l 
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o t h e r s " ] . And where may we b e s t become aware o f t h i s e f f e c t ? "That a t 
I am, Lorde, I o f f r e unto thee, f o r thou i t a r t " (137/1-2; 76/14). One's 
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e x i s t e n c e i s not God, but i t i s the proper e f f e c t of God. 
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We have come f u l l c i r c l e — the "what / t h a t " d i s t i n c t i o n o f the Cloud 
author and h i s i n s i s t e n c e on the " t h a t " should be c l e a r . In the ontology o f 
the Cloud author the Being o f God i s beyond the mode o f knowing o f c r e a t e d 
be i n g s ; we can never know what He i s . But the whole g o a l o f the epistemology 
of the Cloud author i s to know God. F o r t u n a t e l y we can know that God i s . 
I f the Cloud author were t o r e f e r h i s d i s c i p l e t o an a u t h o r i t y t o e x p l a i n 
f u l l y why he must t r y " f o r to thenk and f o r to f e l e h i s owne propre beyng" 
(138/2-3; 73/3), he might suggest the f o l l o w i n g from the Summa Contra 
Gentiles where Aquinas i s d i s c u s s i n g how men and angels ("separate substances") 
may u l t i m a t e l y know God i n the same way: 
Cognoscit tamen s u b s t a n t i a s e p a r a t a per suam substantiam de Deo 
q u i a e s t ; e t quod e s t omnium causa; e t eminentem omnibus; e t 
remotum ab omnibus, non solum quae sunt, sed e t i a m quae mente 
c r e a t a c o n c i p i possunt. Ad quam etiam cognitionem de Deo nos 
utcumque p e r t i n g e r e possumus: per e f f e c t u s enim de Deo cognoscimus 
q u i a e s t e t quod causa a l i o r u m e s t , a l i i s supereminens, e t ab 
omnibus remotus. E t hoc e s t ultimum e t p e r f e c t i s s i m u m nostrae 
c o g n i t i o n i s i n hac v i t a , ut Dionysius d i c i t , i n l i b r o de Mystica 
Theologia, cum Deo q u a s i ignoto coniungimur: quod quidem con-
t i n g i t dum de eo quid non sit cognoscimus, q u i d vero s i t p e n i t u s 
manet ignotum. Unde e t ad huius sublimissimae c o g n i t i o n i s 
ignorantiam demonstrandam, de Moyse d i c i t u r Exod: 20, 21, quod 
accessit ad"caliginem in qua est Deus. [However, a separate sub-
stance does know through i t s own substance that God i s , and that 
He i s the cause o f a l l t h i n g s , t h a t He i s eminent above a l l and 
s e t a p a r t from a l l , not o n l y from things which e x i s t , b u t a l s o 
from things which can be conceived by the c r e a t e d mind. Even we 
are a b l e to reach t h i s knowledge o f God, i n some sense; f o r 
we know through His e f f e c t s t h a t God i s , and t h a t He i s the cause 
o f o t h e r b e i n g s , t h a t He i s superemlnent oyer o t h e r t h i n g s and 
s e t apart from a l l . And t h i s i s the u l t i m a t e and most p e r f e c t 
l i m i t o f our knowledge i n t h i s l i f e , as Dionysius says i n 
Mystical Theology. "We are u n i t e d with God as the Unknown." 
Indeed, t h i s i s the s i t u a t i o n , f o r , while we know o f God what He 
is not, what He is remains q u i t e unknown. Hence to m a n i f e s t h i s 
ignorance of t h i s sublime knowledge, i t i s s a i d o f Moses t h a t "he 




I t i s i n order to a i d h i s d i s c i p l e to e n t e r t h i s "dark c l o u d " so t h a t he 
might experience God t h a t the anonymous author o f The Cloud of Unknowing 
urges him " f o r to thenk and to f e l e h i s own propre b e i n g . " T h i s i s but the 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r m y s t i c a l contemplation: a c o n c e n t r a t e d emotional and 
mental awareness o f h i s own e x i s t e n c e i s something the Cloud author i n 
a t y p i c a l l y simple and g r a p h i c phrases b i d s the d i s c i p l e to " f i r s t gnawe 
on . . . unto the tyme t h a t thou mightest be maad ab l e to the highe f e l y n g 
o f God b i g o o s t l y contynowaunce o f t h i s p r i v e werk" (156/6-8; 89/4-7) . 
From h i s own " t o be" the d i s c i p l e i s to r i s e and l o s e h i m s e l f i n the "high 
f e l y n g " o f t h a t which i s the source o f e x i s t e n c e and which i s e x i s t e n c e i t -
s e l f : God: "Esse primum . . . e s t Deus" (In Lib. de Causis 12.1.12.282). 
"To be": e x i s t e n c e : esse: f o r Aquinas and the anonymous author o f 
The Cloud of Unknowing: 
For y i f thou sey "Good" o r " F a i r e Lorde" . . . "Love" o r " C h a r i t e , " 
or what o t h e r soche t h i n g t h a t thou sey o f God: a l i t i s h i d and 
e n s t o r i d i n t h i s l i t i l worde IS. For t h a t same i s to him only to 
be, t h a t i s a l l e thees f o r to be. And y i f thou put t o an h u n d r i d 
thousand soche swete wordes as ben thees — good, f a i r e , and a l l e 
thees o t h e r — y i t y e d e s t thou not f r o t h i s worde I S . An y i f 
thou sey hem a l l e , thou p u t t e s t not to i t . And i f thou sey r i g h t 
none, thou t a k i s t not f r o i t . (143/22-30, 144/1; 80/35-43) 
For the Cloud author the d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and e x i s t e n c e was 
r e a l . More than j u s t an i d e a t h a t e x i s t e d i n the minds o f t h e o l o g i a n s and 
p h i l o s o p h e r s , i t allowed him to d e f i n e a view o f r e a l i t y , to f o l l o w a c e r t a i n 
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way o f l i f e , and t o produce g r e a t s p i r i t u a l l i t e r a t u r e . 
M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y 
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Th i s paper o r i g i n a t e d a t the meetings o f the Canadian Learned S o c i e t i e s : 
The A s s o c i a t i o n o f Canadian U n i v e r s i t y Teachers o f E n g l i s h , U n i v e r s i t e de 
Montreal, June 1985. 
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A b b r e v i a t i o n s 
The Cloud author: a l l r e f e r e n c e s are to The Book of Privy Counselling unless 
they are preceded by the f o l l o w i n g a b b r e v i a t i o n s : 
CU: The Cloud of Unknowing ( i n n. 1) 
DHD: Deonise Hid Divinite ( i n n. 1) 
PP: Pistle of Preir ( i n n. 1) 
S t Thomas Aquinas: 
In Lib. De Causis: In Librum de Causis ( i n n. 11) 
In [numeral] Meta.: In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis ( i n n. 26) 
SCG: Summa Contra Gentiles ( i n n. 16) 
ST: Summa Theologiae ( i n n. 14) 
Quodl.: Quaestiones Quodlibetales ( i n n. 11) 
1 References t o the Cloud author r e f e r t o the f o l l o w i n g t e x t s : f i r s t 
s e t o f numerals = page(s) and l i n e number(s) i n The Cloud of Unknowing and 
The Book of Privy Counselling, ed. P. Hodgson (1944; r p t . London 1981), o r , 
Deonise Hid Divinite: and Other Treatises on Contemplative Prayer Related to 
'The Cloud of Unknowing', ed. P. Hodgson (London 1955); second s e t o f 
numerals = The Cloud of Unknowing and Related Treatises, ed. P h y l l i s Hodgson 
(S a l z b u r g 1982) . In t h i s a r t i c l e M.E. thorn i s t r a n s l i t e r a t e d as t h , yogh 
as y o r gh, u as v, and v as u where a p p r o p r i a t e , and ampersand (&) as and. 
2 
Rosemary Ann Lees, The Negative Language of the Dionysian School of 
Mystical Theology: An Approach to the Cloud of Unknowing, 2 v o l s . (Salzburg 
1983) I I , 317. 
3 For a summary o f Aquinas's distinctio realis between essence and 
e x i s t e n c e and the o t h e r major p o s i t i o n s o f the p e r i o d (distinctio modalis or 
formal is, distinctio rationis) see C. Fabro "Un i t i n e r a i r e de S a i n t Thomas. 
L ' e t a b l i s s e m e n t de l a d i s t i n c t i o n r e e l l e entre essence e t e x i s t e n c e , " 
Revue de Philosoph'ie 4 (1939) 285-310; Etienne G i l s o n , Being and Some 
Philosophers (Toronto 1949) 74-107; M a r t i n Heidegger, The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, t r . A l f r e d H o f s t a d t e r (Bloomington 1982) 77-98. 
4 
W i l l i a m Johnston, i n The Mysticism of 'The Cloud of Unknowing': A 
Modern Interpretation (St Meinrad 1975), devotes s e v e r a l pages t o the 
d o c t r i n e o f essence and ex i s t e n c e and r e l a t e s i t t o Aquinas, but he does not 
demonstrate t h i s d o c t r i n e , and what he does say i s p o t e n t i a l l y m i s l e a d i n g . 
Johnston s t a t e s t h a t the Cloud author "continues to s t r e s s t h a t m y s t i c a l 
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knowledge i s not e s s e n t i a l but e x i s t e n t i a l . I t i s the meeting o f two 
e x i s t e n c e s " (45) . B a s i c to the d o c t r i n e o f the r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s another 
d o c t r i n e o f Aquinas (SCG 3.65) and Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram, 4.12, 
PL 34.304), t h a t i s , the c r e a t i v e and s u s t a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p o f God's 
e x i s t e n c e t o t h a t o f man. Johnston f a i l s to p o i n t out the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between God's e x i s t e n c e and t h a t o f the c o n t e m p l a t i v e . David Knowles, i n 
"The E x c e l l e n c e o f the Cloud," Downside Review 52 (1934) 71-92, a s s e r t s 
t h a t the works o f the Cloud author "are the work o f a Thomist. . . . The 
thought and e x p r e s s i o n are Thomist, not S c o t i s t , o r N o m i n a l i s t . " However, 
Knowles does not d i s c u s s o r a l l u d e to the d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and 
e x i s t e n c e t o demonstrate t h i s a s s e r t i o n ; r a t h e r , he demonstrates the Thomis-
t i c nature o f "the theory o f the r e l a t i o n s o f love and knowledge, and the 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f the l i f e o f g r a c e " (74) i n the works o f the Cloud a u t h o r . 
James Walsh, i n h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n to h i s modern E n g l i s h v e r s i o n o f The Cloud 
of Unknowing (New York 1981) , p o i n t s out s e v e r a l areas o f T h o m i s t i c i n - ' 
f l u e n c e , but does not r e f e r to the d o c t r i n e o f essence and e x i s t e n c e . J.P.H. 
C l a r k , i n "Sources and Theology in'The,Cloud o f Unknowing,'" Downside Review 
98 (1980) 83-109, a l s o i n d i c a t e s d i f f e r e n t i n f l u e n c e s o f Aquinas. In a 
b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n on "being" i n The Cloud of Unknowing C l a r k quotes from a 
passage (88) where St Thomas i s drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and 
e x i s t e n c e . However, C l a r k does not c l a i m or i n d i c a t e t h a t such a d i s t i n c t i o n 
i s made by the Cloud a u t h o r . 
^ Most thoroughly by Lees (at n. 2), one o f whose aims i t i s "to s e t 
the c r y p t i c theology o f the Deonise Hid Divinite i n the wider c o n t e x t o f 
the Cloud corpus and the author's intermediary sources o f D i o n y s i a n 
theology" (335). As a sources and i n f l u e n c e s study (Hugh o f Balma, Thomas 
G a l l u s , the V i c t o r i n e s ) , and f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g beyond doubt t h a t the Cloud 
author i s s o l i d l y w i t h i n the Dionysian t r a d i t i o n o f mysticism, Lees's book 
i s i n v a l u a b l e . However, she i g n o r e s the d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and 
e x i s t e n c e , m i s s i n g , I t h i n k , a very important source: Thomas Aquinas. 
6 
Posterior Analytics, t r . Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), 
(2.8, 92b) 197. 
7 
Heidegger (at n. 3) 90. 
g 
For a h i s t o r y o f the term see J.F. Anderson, " E x i s t e n t i a l Metaphysics," 
New Catholic Encyclopedia. 
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9 
Etienne G i l s o n was among the f i r s t t o speak o f a " r e v o l u t i o n " i n 
God and Philosophy (New Haven 1941) 67. John D. Caputo, i n Heidegger and 
Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York 1982) compares 
Heidegger's treatment o f the " e x i s t e n t i a l r e v o l u t i o n i n Th o m i s t i c meta-
p h y s i c s " (8) w i t h t h a t o f G i l s o n . See a l s o W i l l i a m E . C a r l o , The Ultimate 
Reducibility of Essence to Existence in Existential Metaphysics (The Hague 
1966) f o r a c l e a r and co n c i s e review o f the " r e v o l u t i o n a r y i d e a s " (10) o f 
Aquinas . 
1 0 See Joseph Owens, "The A c c i d e n t a l and E s s e n t i a l Character o f Being," 
Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958): i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n ens and esse 
"may be e q u a l l y t r a n s l a t e d by 'being' and 'a b e i n g ' i n E n g l i s h , and express 
i n the former way the a c t o f being, and i n the l a t t e r way the nature t h a t 
e x i s t s . Both grammatical forms may s i g n i f y e i t h e r i n abstracto o r in 
concreto. Yet S t Thomas uses the i n f i n i t i v e esse to s i g n i f y o n l y in 
abstracto" (15) . Thomas uses ens i n both senses, but "For the most p a r t 
throughout n i s works the p a r t i c i p l e ens i s i n f a c t used by S t Thomas i n the 
sense o f 'that which i s ' " (8), r a t h e r than i n the sense o f the a c t u a l i t y o f 
b e i n g . S t Thomas was l i n g u i s t i c a l l y very c o n s e r v a t i v e and t h i s "departure 
from c u r r e n t usage" (16) was a t y p i c a l . A s i g n i f i c a n t v e r b a l l i n k between 
Aquinas's a b s t r a c t sense o f esse as e x i s t e n c e occurs when the Cloud author 
makes the same departure from common Middle and Modern E n g l i s h usage i n the 
awkward use o f the E n g l i s h i n f i n i t i v e "to be," to i n d i c a t e esse i n the 
statement God "gave thee t o be" (141/15; 79/14), and h i s m u l t i p l e p l a y w i t h 
"to be" and " t h i s l i t i l worde IS" (see 143/16-30; 80/30-43). 
^ Thomas Aquinas Quaestlones Quodlibetales, ed. Raymond S p i a z z i (9th ed., 
T u r i n 1956); my t r a n s l a t i o n s . See a l s o Thomas Aquinas, In Librum de Causis 
— Expositio, ed. C e s l a i Pera ( T u r i n 1955) 6.1.6.175; 18.1.18.344; 12.1.12. 
282. 
12 
C f . Sandra Edwards' i n t r o d u c t i o n t o her t r a n s l a t i o n o f Thomas 
Aquinas, Quodlibetal Questions 1 and 2 (Toronto 1983) 18-21. 
1 3 Heidegger (at n. 3) 88.. 
14 
A l l q u o t a t i o n s and t r a n s l a t i o n s , unless otherwise i n d i c a t e d , are 
from Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 61 v o l s . , gen. ed. Thomas G i l b y , 
O.P. (New York 1963-81). In a d d i t i o n t o the standard r e f e r e n c e I have 
added the volume and page numbers o f the G i l b y e d i t i o n . 
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1 5 Compare G i l s o n (at n. 3) 154 and Heidegger (at n. 3) 100. 
1 6 Thomas Aquinas, Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra errores 
Infidelium qui dicitur Summa Contra Gentiles, 3 v o l s . , ed. D. P e t r i Marc 
(T u r i n 1967) ; my t r a n s l a t i o n . 
1 7 R.E. A l l e n , Plato's Parmenides: Translation and Analysis (Minneapolis 
1983) 191. N.B.: these g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s do not apply t o Neoplatonism. For 
the h armonization o f pagan and C h r i s t i a n Neoplatonism see Stephen Gersh, 
From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and 
Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden 1978) 125-90. On the 
debate o f P l a t o h i m s e l f c o n c e i v i n g o f a transcendent one o r "good" (Republic 
6.509) see A l l e n 188 f f . 
18 
C f . ST (at n. 14) 8:10-11 notes 'e' and ' f . 
1 9 C f . ST (at n. 14) 8:13 note 'p'. 
20 
Gersh (at n. 17): "The N e o p l a t o n i s t s take over the whole o f the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n d o c t r i n e o f c a u s a t i o n but s u b j e c t i t to two fundamental t r a n s -
f o r m a t i o n s . F i r s t i t i s extended beyond the s e n s i b l e world," and secondly 
we see " i t s combination with emanation theory" (32). 
21 
My t r a n s l a t i o n ; t r a n s l a t i o n i n ST (at n. 14): " e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s a t 
a l l r e a l i s from God" (8:7). 
22 
Thomas Aquinas ( i n n. 11); my t r a n s l a t i o n . 
23 
Caputo (at n. 9 ) : " A l l metaphysics moves w i t h i n the d i s t i n c t i o n be-
tween Being and beings, and i n each case Being i s thought o f as some k i n d o f 
ground o r cause o f b e i n g s . T h i s i s c l e a r l y true o f S t Thomas' metaphysics, 
which i s centered on the d i s t i n c t i o n between s u b s i s t e n t Being, esse sub-
sistens, and f i n i t e b eings, ens participatum. F i n i t e beings p a r t i c i p a t e i n 
and depend on Being i t s e l f w h i l e Being, as the s u b s i s t e n t Being communicates 
i t s e l f to b e i n g s " (3) . 
24 
The 1944 e d i t i o n (at n. 1), note t o 140/20: "substaunce: Here i s a 
p l a y on words. Solomon used the word w i t h the secondary meaning o f 
'possession'; the author means i t here t o bear i t s primary meaning o f 
' e s s e n t i a l nature,' 'being'" (207); the 1982 e d i t i o n (at n. 1), note t o 
78/33: "substaunce: 'essence'; c f . 'possessions', 26. Such word p l a y i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " (177) . A clue to the meaning o f "substance" intended, and 
an i n d i c a t i o n o f the Cloud author's s u b t l e grasp o f metaphysics, i s the 
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p l a y w i t h the words "primary" and " f i r s t " (e.g., "the f i r s t o f thy f r u t e s " ) 
throughout t h i s exegesis and i t s r e l a t i o n t o A r i s t o t e l i a n and Thomist " f i r s t 
s ubstance." 
25 
T h i s " f i r s t substance" i s e q u i v a l e n t to the f o u r t h sense o f sub-
stance i n A r i s t o t l e ' s Metaphysics. Aquinas h i m s e l f p o i n t s out (Jn 7 Meta. 
1273) t h a t t h i s sense i s i d e n t i c a l i n d e f i n i t i o n with the " f i r s t substance" 
i n A r i s t o t l e ' s Categories 5.2a.10. 
26 
Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis 
Expositio, ed. M.R. C a t h a l a , exarata r e t r a c t a t u r cura e t s t u d i o , Raymundi 
S p i a z z i ( T u r i n 1950); E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n : Commentary on the Metaphysics of 
Aristotle, 2 v o l s . , t r . John P. Rowan (Chicago 1961). 
27 
See, f o r example, W i l l i a m o f Sherwood Introduction to Logic, t r . 
Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis 1966) 1.13-14, 28-29. 
28 
R.E. M c C a l l , " A c c i d e n t , " New Catholic Encyclopedia, I , 76. 
29 
A r i s t o t l e , Aristotle's Categories and Propositions (De Interpretatione) 
t r . H i p p o c r a t e s G. A p o s t l e ( G r i n e l 1980) 8b25, 15. 
3 0 For c l a r i t y I have t r a n s l a t e d " p r i n c i p i a s p e c i e i " as " p r i n c i p l e s o f 
the s p e c i e s " r a t h e r than ST ( i n n. 14) ( i n t h i s i n s t a n c e ) : " s p e c i f i c 
p r i n c i p l e s ." 
3 ^ To a v o i d c o n f u s i o n , i n t h i s passage I have t r a n s l a t e d the second 
occurrence o f " e s s e n t i a " as "essence"; ST ( i n n. 14) t r a n s l a t e s i t as 
"nature." F o r a f u l l d i s t i n c t i o n between h y p o s t a s i s ("substaunce") and 
essence see ST la.29.3 / 6:48-51. 
32 
Thomas Aquinas, In Librum Beati Dionysii ae Divinis f/ominious: 
Expositio, Cura e t s t u d i o C e s l a i Pera ( T u r i n 1950) 2; my t r a n s l a t i o n . 
Aquinas makes a s i m i l a r statement on the " p l a t o n i c i " i n ST la.29.3 ad 4 / 
6:50-51). 
3 3 ST ( i n n. 14) t r a n s l a t e s "emanationem" as " i s s u i n g , " and "emanatione" 
as " f l o w i n g out"; I t r a n s l a t e both as "emanation" i n o r d e r t o u n d e r l i n e the 
N e o p l a t o n i c c o n n e c t i o n . 
34 
Donungo Banez, The Primacy of Existence m Thomas Aquinas: A 
Commentary on Thomistic Metaphysics, t r . Benjamin S. Llamzan (Chicago 1966) 
34. 
35 My t r a n s l a t i o n . 
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36 Aquinas: " S i c u t i g i t u r f i e r i r e i non p o t e s t remanere, cessante 
a c t i o n e a g e n t i s quod e s t causa e f f e c t u s secundum f i e r i , i t a nec esse r e i 
p o t e t remanere, cessante a c t i o n e agentis quod e s t causa e f f e c t u s non solum 
secundum f i e r i s e d etiam secundum esse" ["Consequently: j u s t as the coming 
to be o f an e f f e c t cannot continue once the a c t i o n o f the agent causing i t s 
coming to be ceases, so too the esse o f an e f f e c t cannot continue once the 
a c t i o n o f the agent causing not only i t s coming to be but a l s o i t s esse 
ceases" (ST la.104.1 / 14:40-41). See a l s o T.C. O'Brien, "Esse, the Proper 
E f f e c t o f God Alone," i n ST ( i n n. 14) v o l . 14, app. 1, 169-75. 
3 7 See ST l a . 104.1, and ST ( i n n. 14) v o l . 14, note "v", 42; a l s o T.C. 
O'Brien, "The Dionysi a n Corpus," i n ST ( i n n. 14) v o l . 14, app. 3, 182-93. 
38 
I b i d . 
39 
For Aquinas on t h i s , see ST la.104.3; la.19.4. 
40 
Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, 3.7, i n Opera Omnia, Parmae E d i t i o n 
(1865; r p t . New York 1949) v o l . 8; t r a n s l a t e d by O'Brien ( i n n. 36) 171. 
41 
T r a n s l a t i o n : Summa Contra Gentiles, 4 v o l s . , v a r i o u s t r a n s l a t o r s 
(1955; r p t . Notre Dame 1975). 
42 
De potentia ( i n n. 40); t r . O'Brien ( i n n. 36) 170. 
4 3 See SCG 3.66; 3.49.4. 
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T r a n s l a t i o n ( i n n. 41) 
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